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Abstract
This study investigates how foreign institutional ownership interacts with accounting con-
servatism in an emerging market setting. We posit that weak investor protection and a high 
degree of information asymmetry between insiders and outside investors increase demand 
for conservative reporting in firms operating in emerging markets. Foreign investors in this 
setting have informational disadvantages relative to their domestic peers and have difficul-
ties in getting access to data. Using a sample of Turkish firms, we find that foreign institu-
tions (particularly foreign corporate investors) demand more conservative reporting in the 
investee firms. Moreover, we show that this association is more pronounced among firms 
with greater asymmetric information problems and growth opportunities. Our additional 
tests reveal that the direction of causality flows from foreign institutional ownership to con-
servatism, and not vice versa.
Keywords Accounting conservatism · Foreign ownership · Institutional investors · 
Emerging market
JEL classification M41 · G2 · G34
1 Introduction
The liberalization of capital markets and the integrated global economy have made for-
eign capital an important source of financing for corporations. Understanding the impact of 
foreign ownership on determining corporate policies has hence gained significant interest. 
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Recent research shows that foreign ownership in domestic companies is associated with 
better corporate governance structure (Aggarwal et  al. 2011; Desender et  al. 2016; Kim 
et al. 2016); higher firm value and performance (Ferreira and Matos 2008); high-quality 
auditor choice (He et al. 2014); and more long-term investment in assets and human capital 
(Bena et al. 2017).
Despite ample research on the factors that attract foreign investors, relatively little 
is known about the influence that foreign investors can exert in promoting conservative 
reporting. This paper seeks to fill this gap by empirically investigating the influence exerted 
by foreign institutional ownership on the extent of firm-level conservative accounting. The 
main motivation emanates from the generally accepted view that foreign investors have an 
informational disadvantage relative to their domestic peers (Ferreira et al. 2017). In addi-
tion to the difficulties in getting access to data, foreign investors are also disadvantaged in 
interpreting the financial statements of domestic corporations (Beneish and Yohn 2008). In 
support of this view, it is shown that foreign investors have stronger incentives to monitor 
the local firms in which they have equity ownership and impact their policies and govern-
ance structure (Desender et al. 2016; Sakaki et al. 2017).
The main research question in this paper is whether foreign institutional investors 
demand a higher level of conservative reporting in domestic investee firms. We argue that 
foreign institutional investors desire greater conservatism, and hence, expect a positive 
relation between the level of their ownership and the degree of accounting conservatism. 
In predicting this relationship, we rely on two premises. First, the high verifiability of dif-
ficult-to-verify information characteristic of conservative reporting can help mitigate the 
degree of information asymmetry between insiders and foreign investors by accelerating 
loss recognition. Second, conservative reporting can alleviate the costly agency incentives 
of corporate managers because it can act as a governance device to compensate for weak 
investor protection and poor corporate governance in a setting where the conflicts between 
controlling and outside shareholders are expected to be severe.
In this study, we examine the relation between foreign institutional ownership and 
accounting conservatism using data from an emerging market. In this respect, Turkey con-
stitutes an ideal setting. Emerging countries are typically characterized by loose institu-
tional arrangements and inadequate protection of investors. Therefore, the potential agency 
and informational benefits of conservative accounting are expected to be more appealing to 
outside investors (Hu and Jiang 2019). Furthermore, a hybrid corporate governance system 
of Turkey, which combines the characteristics of the market-based and relationship-based 
systems, may translate into inferior, not necessarily stronger, rights for stakeholders (Ciftci 
et al. 2019). This, in turn, makes the investigation of the role of conservative reporting in 
reducing the tension between insiders and outside investors more relevant. Also, Turkey is 
a Muslim-majority European Union (EU) candidate with a diverse and sophisticated insti-
tutional setting, which has been shaped over the centuries through political and economic 
interactions with the western and eastern civilizations. In this respect, it is likely to play a 
leading role in terms of the development in financial markets, corporate governance and 
accounting practices. Consequently, the findings of this study may be relevant not only for 
Turkey but also for other countries that can associate themselves more easily with Turkey.
The measurement of the degree of conservative reporting is challenging. We employ 
Basu’s (1997) asymmetric timeliness of earnings as the primary measure of accounting 
conservatism. We also use the transitory gain and loss components suggested by Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) as an alternative measure. In carrying out our regression analysis, 
we use a large dataset of 1618 firm-year observations drawn from non-financial publicly 
listed companies in Turkey over the period 2007–2015. As for the measure of institutional 
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ownership, following Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012), we utilize a measure of residual 
rather than raw ownership to overcome the endogeneity of institutional ownership.
Consistent with our predictions, we find evidence that higher levels of foreign institu-
tional ownership are associated with greater accounting conservatism. Also, this result is 
mainly driven by the behavior of corporate investors who have longer investment horizons 
and greater monitoring power. The findings reveal that the influence exerted by foreign 
institutional ownership is more significant in firms with greater information asymme-
try and growth opportunities. The results are robust to different measures of accounting 
conservatism. Overall, our findings are consistent with the view that foreign institutional 
investors improve investee firms’ financial reporting quality by demanding more conserva-
tive reporting and the demand is stronger when direct monitoring is difficult. Although 
our results indicate a positive relation between foreign institutional ownership and account-
ing conservatism, it is possible that conservative reporting is chosen by domestic firms 
to attract foreign investors. To mitigate this potential reverse causality, we also estimate 
empirical specifications using the lead and lag values of accounting conservatism and for-
eign institutional investment. The results of this analysis suggest that the causality runs 
from residual foreign institutional holdings to accounting conservatism.
Our study complements prior studies on the governance role of accounting conserva-
tism and adds to the strand of the literature that investigates the governance role of for-
eign investors (e.g., Beekes et al. 2004; Bushman et al. 2004; Ahmed and Duellman 2007; 
Lafond and Roychowdhury 2008; García Lara et al. 2009). Although several studies exam-
ine the relation between institutional ownership and conservatism, to our knowledge, this is 
the first study that investigates the impact of foreign institutional ownership on accounting 
conservatism. The closely related prior work is Beuselinck et al. (2017), which find that 
increases in foreign ownership lead to better financial reporting when the investor is domi-
ciled in a strong investor protection country. Our analysis complements this work by exam-
ining the demand for accounting conservatism by foreign institutional investors within a 
unique setting where the protection of investors is relatively weak. Accounting conserv-
atism thus provides a potential channel through which foreign institutional investors can 
extract sufficient information and reduce potential agency conflicts.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion 
of the institutional setting in Turkey. Section 3 develops hypotheses. Section 4 describes 
the data, empirical proxies and specifications. Section 5 presents the results while Sect. 6 
provides additional tests. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2  Institutional setting
The role of accounting is shaped by the institutional setting in which they take place. We, 
therefore, in the following give a brief historical perspective which constitutes a useful 
background to the scope of our study. The first financial modernization step in Ottoman 
Empire was taken in 1839 with the “Tanzimat” edict, which also led to the establishment 
of today’s Ministry of Finance. The Turkish accounting system was initially influenced 
by the French system, and the first accounting regulation of Turkey was the translation 
of the French Commercial Code in 1850. However, the French influence weakened after 
the establishment of modern Turkey in 1923. The second commercial code was enacted 
in 1926 with a strong influence of Germany due to close political connections until World 
War I (Simga-Mugan 1995). Although the influence of the French and German systems is 
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still relatively apparent since the 1950s, the Turkish accounting regime has been influenced 
by the USA accounting system (Elitas and Uc 2009).
With the establishment of the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) (former name of Borsa 
Istanbul) in 1986, Turkey adopted the first set of accounting standards, and all publicly 
listed firms were obligated to follow these standards. Among other regulators in charge 
of the enforcement of accounting standards, the Capital Markets Board (CMB), which is 
established by The Capital Markets Law of 1981, is responsible for determining and moni-
toring the compliance with the accounting and auditing requirements governing the finan-
cial information. The current commercial code, which came into effect in 2012, empowers 
the Turkish Accounting Standards Board (TASB) as the sole authority to set the Turkish 
Accounting Standards (TAS). All companies other than small and medium-sized entities 
(SMEs) are required to prepare their consolidated financial statements following the TAS, 
which are generally based on the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The 
current Commercial Code also requires the audit of financial statements of publicly-held 
companies to be made according to the Turkish Auditing Standards, which are in line with 
the International Standards of Auditing, by independent auditors.1
Aiming to improve the quality of financial reporting and facilitating better access to 
international funds, from January 2005, the CMB permitted the full adoption of IFRS for 
the financial periods ended December 31, 2003, onwards (World Bank 2007). However, 
some dissimilarities between the TAS and IFRS still exist in practice (World Bank 2007).2 
It is worth pointing out that the Revenues Administration within the Ministry of Finance 
also mandates accounting requirements that need to be followed by all entities to meet the 
needs of tax collection. These tax-based requirements, however, do not necessarily satisfy 
the informational needs of several users, such as international investors, which use general 
purpose financial statements for investment decisions.
Finally, foreign investors, according to the Foreign Direct Investment Law No 4875, 
issued in 2003, are free to make investments and transfer profits, dividends, and any other 
proceeds from sales of investment abroad. It is worth noting that listed firms in Turkey are 
subject to the authority of several agencies with overlapping and ambiguous laws, which 
weakens law enforcement and reduces the litigation risk. Although the Turkish civil law 
is broadly influenced by the Anglo-Saxon system, it is a hybrid-based system that is not 
shareholder rights orientated. For example, although the Borsa Istanbul has appropriate 
sanctions and actions, including the requirement to publish information omitted from the 
financial statements, correction of the financial statements, fines, and prohibition of trading 
(World Bank 2007), sanctions are relatively mild and often not applied in practice.
1 The commercial code, Temporary Article 2, mentions: “Until a Turkish Auditing Standards Board with 
a judicial personality is established, the Turkish Auditing Standards, mentioned in Article 397, are deter-
mined by a board affiliated to the Union of Certified Public Accountants of Turkey (TÜRMOB) in har-
mony with ISA. A regulation, regarding which institutions and organisations’ representatives will constitute 
the board and its work principles and procedures, will be prepared by TÜRMOB and published upon the 
approval of the Ministry of Finance.”
2 For a discussion of these differences and non-compliance issues, see the Report on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (World Bank 2007: 24–28) on accounting and auditing in Turkey issued in 2007. The 
report is available at http://docum ents.world bank.org/curat ed/en/97403 14681 72442 987/pdf/66238 0ROSC 
00PU0 4B0Tu rkey0 March 02007 .pdf [accessed 30 December 2018]. .
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3  Hypotheses development
Basu (1997) defines conservatism as the tendency of accountants to require a higher degree 
of verification for recognizing good news than bad news in financial statements. It is meas-
ured as reflecting bad news more quickly than good news in earnings. According to the 
contractual explanation of conservatism, it mitigates the agency problems within firms 
through offsetting the opportunistic behavior of managers and reducing their incentives to 
manipulate earnings (Watts 2003). Given that economic losses are reported more quickly 
than economic gains under a conservative reporting regime, conservatism is expected to 
reduce the ability of managers to overstate earnings and net assets. Equity investors, there-
fore, are likely to demand conservative reporting to mitigate their informational disadvan-
tage position compared to insiders and eliminate any undesirable consequences of infor-
mation asymmetries. In a similar reasoning, conservative reporting disciplines managers 
concerning risky investment decisions since their compensation is directly related to firm 
performance (Ball 2001).
Previous literature provides supporting evidence that equity investors are an important 
source of demand for conservative reporting. LaFond and Watts (2008) find that account-
ing conservatism is a response to the information asymmetries present within firms. Thus, 
an increase in the extent of asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders should 
lead to greater conservatism. In a similar vein, LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) provide 
additional evidence on the relationship between agency costs and accounting conservatism 
focusing on the effects of managerial ownership on accounting conservatism. Their find-
ings show that the demand for conservative financial reporting increases at lower levels of 
managerial ownership when the agency conflicts and costs are expected to be greater.
It is worth noting that foreign institutional investors are subject to greater agency prob-
lems and ex-ante information asymmetry. Given the information gap between local and 
foreign investors as well as inferior legal protection and law enforcement, the managers of 
firms with concentrated ownership may have incentives to limit access to information by 
outside investors (Fan and Wong 2002). Kim and Zhang (2016) find a negative association 
between the degree of conditional conservatism and the likelihood of a firm experienc-
ing future stock price crashes and this association is more pronounced in an environment 
where the extent of information asymmetries is more pronounced. This limited informa-
tion transparency, however, may be compensated by higher demand for more conservative 
reporting by outside investors (Wang 2006).
Earlier studies provide evidence that foreign institutional investors play a crucial role 
in improving the corporate governance quality of firms. It is shown that changes in the 
holdings of foreign institutional ownership lead to subsequent changes in corporate gov-
ernance practices (Gillan and Starks 2003; Aggarwal et al. 2011; Desender et al. 2016) 
and improved voluntary corporate disclosure (Liang et al. 2012). In Taiwan, Liang et al. 
(2012) find a positive association between the likelihood and the frequency of holding 
conference calls and foreign institutional ownership. Additionally, Ramalingegowda and 
Yu (2012) show that the primary demand for conservative reporting arises from moni-
toring institutional investors rather than short-term non-monitoring institutional inves-
tors. Specifically, they find that an increase in the ownership of monitoring institutional 
investors is positively associated with greater demand on accounting conservatism since 
these investors have longer investment horizons, which make them enjoy the benefits of 
conservative reporting. Similarly, Lin (2016) provides supporting evidence on the posi-
tive relationship between dedicated institutional ownership and conservative reporting. 
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In a related study, Cheng et al. (2015) show that hedge fund activists are positively asso-
ciated with higher accounting conservatism from target firms when hedge funds have 
relatively high ownership and hold their investment for at least 1 year. They also find 
more conservative reporting when the pre-intervention of dedicated institutional inves-
tors is low, suggesting a substitution intervention between hedge funds and dedicated 
institutional investors to impose higher conservative reporting in target firms.
Bushman et  al. (2004) demonstrate that the low timeliness of financial reporting 
increases the demand for costly corporate governance mechanisms that help to allevi-
ate moral hazard problems. They find an inverse relation between the strength of cor-
porate governance and earnings timeliness for a sample of firms in the Fortune 1000. 
They conclude that strong corporate governance systems act as a substitute for the low 
timeliness of accounting information. In a similar vein, Wang (2006) examine the asso-
ciation between founding family ownership and the quality of financial reporting for a 
sample of firms listed on the Standard and Poor’s 500 during the period 1994–2002. He 
finds that family ownership is positively associated with higher earnings quality consist-
ent with the view that the interests of founding families are better aligned with those 
of other investors, or the association perhaps resulted from greater demand for higher 
earnings quality by investors. This result is in line with Chen et  al. (2014) who find 
that accounting conservatism increases with non-CEO family ownership and that this 
positive relation is weaker in family firms with a founder CEO. Conversely, Basu et al. 
(2005) show, using a sample of Taiwanese firms during the period 1991–1996, that fam-
ily-owned firms exhibit lower earnings conservatism. However, Eng and Lin (2012) find 
that Chinese firms cross-listed in Hong Kong and the US do not show lesser earnings 
management practice or higher earnings quality. In similar vien, Lai and Tam (2017) 
find no association between foreign ownership and earnings manipulation in China.
There are several reasons for effective monitoring by foreign institutional investors. 
First, compared to domestic investors, foreign investors are more experienced in interna-
tional markets, which make them more aware and informed about the value of improved 
financial reporting quality and better corporate governance practices (Aggarwal et  al. 
2011; Beuselinck et al. 2017). Second, foreign institutional investors can process value-
relevant information more quickly and effectively due to their technological advantage 
(Grinblatt and Keloharju 2000). Third, foreign institutions can impose conservative 
financial reporting directly by voicing their dissatisfaction over the low-quality infor-
mation, or indirectly by selling their shares (‘vote with their feet’) (Gillan and Starks 
2003; Ferreira and Matos 2008; Aggarwal et al. 2011). They are also less hindered by 
close relations and direct business ties with local controlling insiders. Finally, as a result 
of the local and global regulations, institutional investors are considered the guardians 
of corporate governance, which also encourages them to be more active than domes-
tic investors in adopting better governance practices within the firm (Kim et al. 2016). 
Consistent with these views, Kim et al. (2016) and Lel (2017), using cross-country data, 
investigate the role of foreign institutional investors in constraining earnings manage-
ment activities and find that firms with higher foreign ownership engage less in earnings 
manipulation.
The above arguments lead to the following hypothesis:
H1 Foreign institutional ownership is positively associated with financial reporting 
conservatism.
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We argue that foreign institutional investors with different motives and investment 
strategies also differ in the extent of their demand for conservative reporting. The 
agency theory suggests that foreign corporations play more effective monitoring role 
due to their concentrated and larger ownership in domestic firms (Douma et al. 2006). 
They also tend to have a longer investment horizon, and hence, they are more able to 
reap the long-term benefits of conservative reporting. Conversely, foreign financial 
institutions are more interested in short-term profits since the performance of fund 
managers is assessed over relatively shorter durations. Moreover, funds hold smaller 
and fragmented shares in firms to enjoy the benefits of diversification (Douma et  al. 
2006). Furthermore, fund managers tend to change their portfolio holdings when they 
are unable to maintain short-term gains, making them less sensitive to the changes in 
corporate reporting practices. Likewise, prior evidence suggests that institutions with 
greater concentrated and strategic ownership are more likely to monitor the manage-
ment (Chen et al. 2007). Consistent with this view, Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012) find 
a positive relationship between the shareholdings of monitoring institutions and con-
servative reporting. In a similar vein, Lin and Manowan (2012) find a positive relation-
ship between ownership by non-monitoring institutional investors (i.e., transient) and 
earnings management. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that foreign corporate inves-
tors are more likely to have the incentives and ability to enforce higher conservatism in 
financial reporting than foreign funds.
Based on the above discussion, we formulate the second hypothesis as follows:
H2 Foreign corporate ownership is more positively associated with financial reporting 
conservatism than foreign funds ownership.
Furthermore, the governance-related characteristics of firms may also exert a consid-
erable impact on the relationship between foreign institutional ownership and accounting 
conservatism. Since it is more difficult to monitor the managers of high-growth firms and 
firms that are prone to higher information asymmetry, the marginal value of monitoring 
and the demand for conservatism in such firms are greater (Smith and Watts 1992; Rama-
lingegowda and Yu 2012). In support of this argument, Lel (2017) and Kim et al. (2016) 
find that the monitoring effectiveness of foreign investors is more apparent in firms with 
higher agency conflicts and information asymmetries. Kim et al. (2016) also suggest that 
the monitoring effectiveness of global investors is greater in firms with weaker corporate 
governance mechanisms. As argued earlier, foreign investors face informational disadvan-
tages relative to domestic investors, which is at the core of foreign investors’ investment 
decisions. Given the difficulty of direct monitoring in these firms, conservative reporting 
can be desired as an additional governance mechanism that can discipline the manager’s 
reporting incentives. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect a stronger relationship between 
accounting conservatism and the monitoring ownership in firms with greater information 
asymmetry and growth options. The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
H3 The positive association between foreign institutional ownership and conservative 
reporting is more pronounced for firms with greater information asymmetries and growth 
options.
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4  Data and methodology
We obtain the foreign and domestic ownership data from the Central Securities Depository 
Institution of Turkey, which has the authority to issue capital market instruments, register 
the instruments into accounts and keep the records of accounts at the highest level.3 This 
database provides fiscal year-end information about the type of equity ownership such as 
domestic/foreign individuals, investment funds and corporate (corporations and limited lia-
bility companies) investors. The raw ownership data for each ownership category are hand-
collected from annual reports that are obtained from the Central Depository Institution of 
Turkey. We obtain other firm-specific accounting and market data from Datastream. We 
exclude the financial firms in the sample as they are subject to unique disclosure require-
ments, regulation measurement, and external scrutiny. We also drop firms with missing 
ownership and incomplete accounting data required to conduct the empirical analysis. Our 
final sample consists of 1618 firm-years from 2007 to 2015.
4.1  Measurement of residual ownership
Previous evidence on the relationship between conservatism and ownership structure sug-
gests that many of the firm-specific characteristics are endogenously determined (Ramalin-
gegowda and Yu 2012). Such endogeneity arises because firm-specific characteristics, such 
as size and market-to-book ratio, are likely to have an impact on both conservatism and 
ownership. Therefore, following prior research (e.g., LaFond and Roychowdhury 2008; 
Ramalingegowda and Yu 2012), we use residual ownership to avoid potential misspecifica-
tions in our estimations. To obtain the residual ownership, we first estimate the regression 
in Eq.  (1) for each ownership group as defined in Table 1. Then, we extract the residual 
terms ( 휀t ) from these regressions as our residual measures of ownership.
where OWNt institutional ownership, measured as the total value of equity held by each 
institution divided by the market capitalization of the firm at the end of the fiscal year; 
MVt−1 the market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year; Pricet−1 share price at 
the beginning of the fiscal year; MBt−1 market-to-book ratio at the beginning of the fiscal 
year, calculated as the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the 
market value of equity divided by the book value of total assets; Aget The natural loga-
rithm of firm age, measured as the number of years a firm is listed in the Borsa Istanbul; 
Volatilityt−2,t variance of monthly returns from year t − 2 to year t; Turnovert average daily 
trading volume at the end of the fiscal year divided by the number of ordinary shares out-
standing; Momentumt−2,t Gross stock returns for 3  months prior to the end of the fiscal 
year; Momentumt−12,t−3 gross stock returns for 9 months ending 3 months prior to the end 
of the fiscal year; i firm subscript; t year subscript.
(1)
OWNit = 훽0 + 훽1MVit−1 + 훽2Priceit−1 + 훽3MBit−1 + 훽4Ageit
+ 훽5Volatilityit−2,t + 훽6Turnoverit + 훽7Momentumit−2,t
+ 훽8Momentumit−12,t−3 + 휀it
3 Law No. 6493 on Payment and Security Settlement Systems, Payment Services and Electronic Money 
Institutions.
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In estimating the specification in Eq. (1), we include firm and year dummies to control 
for firm-specific fixed and firm-invariant time effects.
4.2  Measure of conservatism
In this study, our primary measure of accounting conservatism is the following Basu’s 
(1997) earnings-return specification:
where NI Net income after extraordinary items scaled by the beginning-of-year mar-
ket value of equity;4 Re 12-month buy-and-hold return during the fiscal year, meas-
ured by compounding market-adjusted monthly stock returns at the fiscal year-end. The 
(2)NIit = 훽0 + 훽1Negit + 훽2Retit + 훽3Negit ∗ Retit + 휀it
Table 1  Definitions of the variables
This table presents the definitions of the variables used in the study. We do not remark the firm subscript i 
for brevity
DIWONt−1 Percentage ownership of domestic institutional investors at the beginning of fiscal year
FIWONt−1 Percentage ownership of foreign institutional investors at the beginning of the fiscal year
FCOWNt−1 Percentage ownership of foreign corporate investors at the beginning of fiscal year
FFOWNt−1 Percentage ownership of foreign funds at the beginning of fiscal year
RDIWONt−1 Residual percentage ownership of domestic institutional investors at the beginning of fiscal 
year
RFIWONt−1 Residual percentage ownership of foreign institutional investors at the beginning of fiscal 
year
RFCOWNt−1 Residual percentage ownership of foreign corporate investors at the beginning of fiscal year
RFFOWNt−1 Residual percentage ownership of foreign funds at the beginning of fiscal year
NIt Net income after extraordinary items scaled by beginning of the year market value of equity
Rett 12-month buy-and-hold return during the the fiscal year, measured by compounding market-
adjusted monthly stock returns at the fiscal year-end
Negt A dummy variable takes the value of one if Ret is negative, and zero otherwise
RISKt−1 Standard deviation of the residuals from the market model estimated by regressing the 
excess return of the stock with the excess return of the market. We use 3 months treasury 
bill rate as risk-free rate and BIST100 index as the market proxy at the beginning of fiscal 
year
AGEt−1 Natural logarithm of the number of years a firm is listed on Borsa Istanbul (former name 
IMKB) at the beginning of fiscal year
SIZEt−1 Natural logarithm of the market value of the firm at the beginning of fiscal year
MBt−1 The ratio of book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of 
equity to the book value of assets at the beginning of fiscal year
LEVt−1 Total debt divided by the total assets at the beginning of fiscal year
LITt−1 A dummy variable takes the value of one if the firm belongs to Retailers (ICB sector code 
404010), Software and Computer Services (ICB sector code 101010), Technology, Hard-
ware and Equipment (ICB sector code 101020), Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology (ICB 
sector code 201030) sectors, at the beginning of the fiscal year
4 We obtain qualitatively similar results when NI is defined as net income before extraordinary items scaled 
by the beginning-of-year market value of equity.
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market-adjusted returns are computed by subtracting the market returns from the stock 
return5,6; Neg A dummy variable that takes the value of one if Ret is negative and zero 
otherwise.
Basu (1997) provides evidence that earnings are more sensitive to bad news than good 
news. In this model, negative (positive) returns account for the bad (good) news. The coef-
ficient β2 is a measure of the sensitivity of earnings to good news while (β2+ β3) reflects the 
bad news. As a result, β3 captures the incremental sensitivity of earnings to bad over good 
news. Basu (1997) predicts a stronger reaction of earnings to bad rather than good news 
because accountants have mechanisms to incorporate future losses into financial reports, 
but not future profits. It is argued that the potential bias and measurement errors associ-
ated with the Basu earnings-based model measure are severe (Dietrich et al. 2007; Givoly 
et al. 2007). For instance, Dietrich et al. (2007) argue that the evidence of conservatism in 
prior studies cannot be interpreted as evidence of conservatism, but it is attributable to the 
biased test statistics inherent in the asymmetric timeliness research design. However, the 
empirical evidence reported by Ball et  al. (2013), Ettredge et  al. (2012), and Jayaraman 
(2012) find that the Basu’s measure is effective in capturing conditional conservatism at 
the firm level. Proponents of the Basu earnings-based measure of conditional conserva-
tism argue that the sources of bias raised in the literature can be easily identified and dealt 
with (Ryan 2006; Khan and Watts 2009; Ball et al. 2013). We use, in Sect. 6.1, the transi-
tory gain and loss components suggested by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) as an alternative 
measure for accounting conservatism.
4.3  Empirical model
To test the relationship between residual foreign institutional ownership and accounting 
conservatism, we follow prior research (e.g., Lafond and Roychowdhury 2008; LaFond and 
Watts 2008; Ramalingegowda and Yu 2012) and extend the original specification of Basu 
(1997) by incorporating the residual ownership and other firm-specific determinants of 
conservatism. We estimate the following model:
where RFOWNit−1 is the residual ownership by each group of foreign investors as estimated 
in Eq. (1). In Eq. (3), the main coefficient of interest is β7, which captures the impact of 
(3)
NIit = 훽0 + 훽1Negit + 훽2Retit + 훽3Negit ∗ Retit + 훽4RFOWNit−1
+ 훽5Negit ∗ RFOWNit−1 + 훽6Retit ∗ RFOWNit−1
+ 훽7Negit ∗ Retit ∗ RFOWNit−1 + 훽8−12Controlsit−1
+ 훽13−17Negit ∗ Controlsit−1 + 훽18−22Retit ∗ Controlsit−1
+ 훽23−27Negit ∗ Retit ∗ Controlsit−1 + 휀it
5 We use the market-adjusted returns rather than raw returns to control for the impact of market-wide 
shocks and jumps on firm-specific earnings (Shroff et al. 2013). We take BIST100 index as our proxy for 
the market, which includes the top 100 listed firms in Borsa Istanbul in terms of market capitalization. 
When calculating the market-adjusted returns, we include year fixed-effects in all estimations to remove 
common shocks from both sides of the equation of Basu’s model.
6 In unreported tests, our results are similar if we use 12-month buy-and-hold return, measured by com-
pounding market-adjusted monthly stock returns ending three months after the months after the fiscal year-
end.
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residual foreign institutional ownership on accounting conservatism. Following prior 
research (Ramalingegowda and Yu 2012), we also include residual ownership by domestic 
investors to mitigate the potential omitted variable concerns.
We also include several other control variables in our baseline specification. We incor-
porate the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of firms, SIZE, as a proxy for firm 
size. Since large firms are expected to be better managed, exposed to higher public pres-
sure, and enjoy economies of scale in monitoring self-interest managerial behavior (Him-
melberg et  al. 1999; Chen and Yur-Austin 2007), we expect that their demand for con-
servatism to be low (LaFond and Watts 2008; Ramalingegowda and Yu 2012). It is argued 
that high levered firms are more likely to experience greater conflicts between debtholders 
and shareholders, which in turn increases the demand for conservative reporting (Ball and 
Shivakumar 2005; Khan and Watts 2009). To account for this, we incorporate total debt 
scaled by total assets, LEV, as a proxy for leverage. We include market-to-book ratio, MB, 
to control for the impact of growth options. Firms with high growth options have greater 
volatility in cash flows and greater agency conflicts between managers and shareholders.
Given that conservatism is to some extent a response to agency problems, we expect a 
positive relationship between MB and conservatism (LaFond and Watts 2008). Khan and 
Watts (2009) argue that conservatism decreases with firm age, AGE, since younger firms 
face greater investment opportunities and growth options (Giner and Ress 2001; Ball and 
Shivakumar 2005). We also include stock return volatility, RISK, to control for uncertainty 
about the financial environment in which firms operate. Khan and Watts (2009) find that 
conservatism increases with the firm-specific uncertainty due to its negative correlation 
with the stock returns. Finally, high litigation risk, LIT, is expected to increase the demand 
for conservative reporting. Following Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012) and LaFond and 
Roychowdhury (2008), we use an indicator variable if the firm operates in an industry with 
Table 2  Descriptive statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables employed in the analysis based on the full sample 
that includes 1618 firm-year observations over 2007–2015. Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. We 
do not remark the firm subscript i for brevity
Mean SD P10 P25 Median P75 P90
DIOWNt−1 0.092 0.145 0.001 0.005 0.031 0.103 0.270
FIOWNt−1 0.094 0.149 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.133 0.271
DCOWNt−1 0.082 0.143 0.000 0.002 0.017 0.087 0.260
DFOWNt−1 0.006 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.014
FCOWNt−1 0.049 0.119 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.045 0.126
FFOWNt−1 0.045 0.081 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.053 0.154
NIt 0.040 0.262 − 0.168 − 0.025 0.051 0.123 0.218
Rett 0.065 0.451 − 0.408 − 0.226 0.011 0.285 0.619
Negt 0.482 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
RISKt−1 0.027 0.009 0.018 0.021 0.026 0.032 0.038
AGEt−1 2.646 0.539 1.946 2.398 2.773 3.045 3.178
SIZEt−1 18.978 1.759 16.821 17.708 18.830 20.083 21.291
MBt−1 1.415 1.086 0.739 0.921 1.136 1.518 2.119
LEVt−1 0.218 0.195 0.000 0.047 0.182 0.349 0.485
LITt−1 0.129 0.335 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
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high litigation risk.7 We also include year dummies into our model to control for firm-
invariant time effects. Variable definitions are provided in Table 1.
5  Empirical results
5.1  Descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. The 
average raw ownership of domestic, DIOWN, and foreign institutional investors, FIOWN, 
are respectively 9.2% and 9.4%. The holdings of foreign corporate investors, FCOWN, and 
foreign funds, FFOWN, are 4.9% and 4.5%, respectively. This figure implies that the aver-
age ownership of foreign funds and foreign corporate investors are divided almost equally 
among our sample firms. Table 3 reports the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients 
among the variables used in this study. The correlation coefficients among control vari-
ables are generally low. The highest and lowest correlation coefficients among control vari-
ables are between SIZE and MB (0.32) and SIZE and RISK (-0.40), respectively.
5.2  Multivariate results
Table  4 reports the results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for H1. All 
regressions are estimated using robust standard errors clustered at the firm and year levels 
to correct for heteroscedasticity and serial dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). 
Throughout the paper, all significance levels are two-tailed. In Model (1), we present the 
results of the baseline analysis where we provide the estimated coefficients for all vari-
ables except for those of ownership. We find the estimated coefficients are insignificant 
at any level. The results suggest that firm-specific accounting variables do not explain the 
variation in conservative reporting for the firms in Turkey. In other words, the dynamics 
of reporting practices concerning conservative reporting in emerging markets are different 
from those in developed countries. In Model (2), we report the results of the specifica-
tion where the association between foreign institutional (residual) ownership and account-
ing conservatism. For brevity, we do not present the estimated coefficients of stand-alone 
control variables and their interactions with Ret and Neg. The results show that the coef-
ficient of Retit ∗ RFIOWNit−1 is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level while, 
consistent with our predictions, the estimated coefficient of Negit ∗ Retit ∗ RFIOWNit−1 is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The finding suggests that firms rec-
ognize economic losses more quickly than economic gains with the increase of foreign 
institutional ownership. This is in support of the view that accounting conservatism is an 
effective corporate governance device that is more likely to counter the managerial incen-
tives to overstate earnings and reap benefits at the expense of minority shareholders, which 
is consistent with  H1. In contrast, we find no evidence that higher residual ownership by 
domestic institutional investors is associated with accounting conservatism. The estimated 
coefficient of Negit ∗ Retit ∗ RDIOWNit−1 is insignificant at any conventional significance 
level. To the extent that domestic investors have an informational advantage over foreign 
7 We also perform additional estimations by excluding the LIT from our model. Our results remain qualita-
tively similar.
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Table 4  The effect of foreign ownership on accounting conservatism
Exp. sign (1) (2) (3) (4)
Rett 0.530 0.671 0.635 0.525
(0.825) (0.807) (0.841) (0.792)
Negt 0.052 0.060 0.069 0.049
(0.241) (0.245) (0.247) (0.247)
Rett*Negt + 0.108 − 0.021 0.012 0.148
(1.232) (1.184) (1.198) (1.214)
RFOWNt−1 − 0.014 0.239 − 0.119
(0.320) (0.330) (0.333)
Rett*RFIOWNt−1 − 1.715**
(0.520)
RETt*RFCOWNt−1 − 1.431*
(0.656)
Rett*RFFOWNt−1 − 1.225*
(0.613)
Negt*RFIOWNt−1 0.061
(0.586)
Negt*RFCOWNt−1 − 0.300
(0.555)
Negt*RFFOWNt−1 0.186
(0.405)
Rett*Negt*RFIOWNt−1 + 1.701***
(0.195)
Rett*Negt*RFCOWNt−1 + 1.305**
(0.424)
Rett*Negt*RFFOWNt−1 ? 1.010
(0.930)
Rett*Negt*RDIOWNt−1 ? − 0.859 0.464 0.039 − 0.729
(0.599) (0.566) (0.719) (0.573)
Rett*Negt*SIZEt−1 − 0.004 0.013 0.012 0.001
(0.070) (0.068) (0.068) (0.070)
Rett*Negt*LEVt−1 + − 0.623 − 0.583 − 0.576 − 0.651
(0.550) (0.554) (0.559) (0.554)
Rett*Negt*MBt−1 − 0.007 0.001 0.002 0.008
(0.041) (0.036) (0.037) (0.040)
Rett*Negt*RISKt−1 + − 6.686 − 8.575 − 7.374 − 7.807
(5.899) (6.545) (6.488) (5.682)
Ret*Neg*AGEt−1 − 0.035 0.033 0.015 0.050
(0.118) (0.115) (0.109) (0.127)
Ret*Neg*LITt−1 + − 0.061 − 0.057 − 0.061 − 0.056
(0.135) (0.120) (0.134) (0.122)
Controlst−1 Included Included Included Included
Rett*controlst−1 Included Included Included Included
Negt*controlst−1 Included Included Included Included
R2 0.136 0.150 0.141 0.141
# observations 1618 1618 1618 1618
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investors and they may have a supplementary access to internal financial and management 
information through alternative communication channels that may substitute for conserva-
tism. Another alternative explanation is that local investors may not have the incentives 
to closely monitor corporate managers or pressure them for changes (Chen et  al. 2007). 
Adopting more conservative reporting may harm their business relations with management 
(Gillan and Starks 2003).
Next, we investigate whether foreign corporations’ demand for conservatism is different 
from that of foreign funds. We carry out this analysis by separating the residual owner-
ship by foreign institutions into two distinct sub-groups, namely corporations and funds’ 
residual ownership, and test their impact on conservative reporting. We group foreign insti-
tutional investors into foreign corporate investors and foreign funds using the classification 
provided by Borsa Istanbul and Capital Markets Board of Turkey. At the end of each fis-
cal year, Borsa Istanbul reports the ownership of foreign investors in listed firms in Borsa 
Istanbul, classifying ownership as foreign corporate ownership, foreign funds ownership, 
and foreign individual ownership. Foreign corporate ownership includes all foreign corpo-
rations and limited liability companies, whereas foreign funds ownership includes invest-
ment funds. Different from the US and the UK studies, we are unable to categorize foreign 
institutional investors as dedicated and transient or as hedge funds and pension funds due 
to unavailability of these data. We divide the ownership amount of each group by the total 
market capitalization of the firm to calculate the raw ownership ratio.8 Then, we estimate 
Eq. (1) for each group and predict the residuals as our primary measure of foreign corpo-
rate and funds ownership.
The results are reported in Models (3) and (4). The estimated coefficient for residual 
ownership by foreign corporations in Model (3) is positive and significant at the 5% level, 
while the estimated coefficient of Negit ∗ Retit ∗ RFFOWNit−1 , β7, given in Model (4) is 
positive but not significant. These results possibly indicate that firms with higher corporate 
foreign ownership leads to greater conservatism in financial reporting, consistent with  H2. 
It seems that disaggregating foreign institutions as foreign corporations and funds provides 
additional insights into the understanding of the sources of the demand for conservatism.
Taken together, the regression results reported in Table  4 are supportive of our con-
juncture that higher foreign institutional ownership makes earnings more asymmetrically 
timely in recognizing bad news than good news. Our results also suggest that the demand 
for conservative financial reporting arises mainly from foreign corporate investors rather 
than foreign funds or domestic investors.
Table 4  (continued)
This table reports results from the pooled OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is NI, defined as 
net income after extraordinary items, scaled by the beginning of the year market value of equity. All estima-
tions include year dummies. Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. Cluster-adjusted robust standard 
errors are in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and year level. ***, **, * denote signifi-
cance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (two-tailed). We do not remark the firm subscript i for brevity
8 We did not include foreign individual investors into our analysis for two reasons. First, we find that the 
total shares held by foreign individual investors is less than 1% of the free-float market capitalization of 
Borsa Istanbul. Second, individual investors may not value or extract the benefits associated with conserva-
tism.
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5.3  Investee firm characteristics and accounting conservatism
In this section, we further test how the relationship between foreign institutional ownership 
and conservatism varies with the degrees of information asymmetry and growth opportuni-
ties. Following earlier work, we use bid-ask-spread, SPREAD, and firm size, SIZE, as prox-
ies of information asymmetry (see, e.g., LaFond and Watts 2008; Ramalingegowda and Yu 
2012; Kim et al. 2013). We measure SPREAD as the yearly average of daily bid-ask spread 
over the prior year, computed as [(ask − bid)/(ask + bid)/2] for each firm. We partition firms 
based on the median values of SPREAD and SIZE. We label firms with above-median val-
ues of SPREAD and SIZE as firms with high information asymmetry. We estimate Eq. (3) 
for each group and test whether the relationship between foreign institutional ownership 
and conservatism varies across the sub-groups. Similarly, we partition firms based on the 
median value of the market-to-book ratio, MB. Specifically, firms with above median (less 
than or equal the median value) MB form high-growth (low-growth) sub-group.
Given that smaller firms and firms with high bid-ask spread are expected to experience 
greater agency costs (Ramalingegowda and Yu 2012), we expect that the positive relation-
ship between residual ownership by foreign institutions and accounting conservatism to be 
more pronounced among small firms and firms with high bid-ask spreads (Kim et al. 2016; 
Lel 2017). This is because monitoring the managers of small firms is likely to be costly 
because they are less visible, less exposed to political intrusion and public pressure than 
large firms (Watts and Zimmerman 1990). Also, a higher bid-ask spread is likely to indi-
cate higher information asymmetry between informed and less informed investors in the 
capital market (Kim et al. 2013).
The results in Models (2) and (3) of Table  5 show that the estimated coefficient of 
Negit ∗ Retit ∗ RFIOWNit−1 is positive and significant at 10% for firms with high bid-ask 
spread and small firms sub-groups. These results indicate that the positive impact of for-
eign institutions ownership on conservative reporting is only evident for firms with greater 
information asymmetry In Models (5) and (6), the positive association between con-
servatism and residual ownership by foreign institutions holds only for the high-growth 
sub-groups.9
6  Additional analyses
6.1  Alternative measure for accounting conservatism
We use thus far the extended version of Basu’s (1997) model to measure conservatism. 
It is, however, argued that the potential bias and measurement errors associated with the 
Basu’s earnings-based model measure could be significant (Dietrich et  al. 2007; Givoly 
et al. 2007).
As a robustness check, we employ an alternative firm-year measure for conservatism, 
which is a non-return measure that is based on the current earnings-changes model sug-
gested by Ball and Shivakumar (2005). Based on the asymmetric persistence of negative 
earnings changes, Basu (1997) finds that negative changes in earnings (i.e. transitory loss 
9 We continue our analysis only for the foreign corporate investors since the main driver for conservatism 
arises from the corporate investors than funds.
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components in earnings) are less persistent than positive changes in earnings (i.e. transi-
tory gain components in earnings). Using the transitory gain and loss components as a 
Table 5  The effect of foreign ownership on accounting conservatism and partitioned by the level of infor-
mation asymmetry and growth opportunities
This table reports results from the pooled OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is NI, defined as 
net income after extraordinary items, scaled by the beginning of the year market value of equity. All estima-
tions include year dummies. Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. Cluster-adjusted robust standard 
errors are in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and year level. ***, **, * denote signifi-
cance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (two-tailed). We do not remark the firm subscript i for brevity
Exp. sign Firm size Bid-ask spread Growth opportunities
(1)
Large
(2)
Small
(3)
High
(4)
Low
(5)
Low
(6)
High
Rett 0.619 1.887 1.665 − 1.113 − 0.890 1.856**
(0.647) (1.988) (1.009) (0.716) (0.856) (0.786)
Negt 0.426 − 0.521 − 0.068 − 0.080 − 0.325 0.375*
(0.309) (1.003) (0.499) (0.318) (0.522) (0.168)
Rett*Negt + 0.101 − 3.063 − 1.942 2.642*** 1.926 − 1.444
(0.969) (2.768) (1.717) (0.711) (1.184) (1.274)
RFOWNt−1 − 0.242 − 0.033 0.116 − 0.413* − 0.469 0.507
(0.158) (0.935) (0.765) (0.184) (0.604) (0.438)
Rett*RFIOWNt−1 − 0.090 − 2.363* − 2.648* 0.410 − 1.184* − 2.511
(0.443) (1.178) (1.321) (0.559) (0.566) (1.533)
Negt*RFIOWNt−1 0.514 0.362 − 0.050 0.346 0.331 − 0.304
(0.365) (1.336) (1.089) (0.503) (1.006) (0.499)
Rett*Negt*RFIOWNt−1 + 0.622 2.452* 2.034* − 0.360 0.808 2.922*
(0.708) (1.285) (0.984) (0.534) (1.767) (1.540)
Rett*Negt*RDIOWNt−1 ? 0.538 − 0.085 0.228 0.072 1.121 0.211
(0.492) (0.758) (0.718) (0.526) (1.371) (0.749)
Rett*Negt*SIZEt−1 − − 0.017 0.218 0.128 − 0.127*** − 0.080 0.103
(0.033) (0.175) (0.091) (0.036) (0.060) (0.095)
Rett*Negt*LEVt−1 + − 0.015 − 0.875 − 0.977 0.155 − 0.098 − 0.948
(0.336) (0.852) (0.831) (0.385) (0.514) (0.854)
Rett*Negt*MBt−1 − 0.012 0.156 − 0.019 0.058 − 0.384 − 0.045
(0.028) (0.157) (0.055) (0.042) (0.473) (0.034)
Rett*Negt*RISKt−1 + − 9.099 − 13.641 − 6.749 − 14.812 − 19.565* 3.280
(6.290) (9.710) (8.618) (9.175) (8.834) (6.363)
Rett*Negt*AGEt−1 − 0.158 − 0.166 − 0.030 0.008 0.140 − 0.121
(0.154) (0.235) (0.262) (0.101) (0.167) (0.206)
Rett*Negt*LITt−1 + − 0.075 − 0.036 0.095 − 0.168 − 0.179 0.008
(0.115) (0.264) (0.247) (0.215) (0.407) (0.125)
Controls t−1 Included Included Included Included Included Included
Rett*Controlst−1 Included Included Included Included Included Included
Negt*Controlst−1 Included Included Included Included Included Included
R2 0.193 0.174 0.166 0.244 0.240 0.158
# observations 809 809 809 809 809 809
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measure of timeliness in loss recognition, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) estimate the follow-
ing model:
where ∆NI is the change in earnings before extraordinary items from year t − 1 to year t, 
deflated by the beginning book value of equity; and Neg is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if prior-year change ∆NI is negative, and zero otherwise.
To test the relation between foreign institutional ownership and accounting conserva-
tism in a similar framework, we extend the original specification of Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005) by incorporating the residual ownership by foreign and domestic institutions and 
other firm-specific determinants of conservatism to the following model:
The results are reported in Table  6. The estimated coefficients in Model (1) confirm 
the positive relation between foreign institutional ownership and conservatism, albeit at 
a lower significance level. Specifically, the coefficient of Negit ∗ ΔNIit ∗ RFIOWNit−1 is 
negative and significant at the 10% level, suggesting that foreign institutional ownership is 
associated with less persistent transitory losses (i.e., higher earnings conservatism). In line 
with the results documented earlier, the findings in Models (3) and (5) confirms that the 
demand on conservatism by foreign institutions is more apparent when information asym-
metry is acute. Specifically, the estimated coefficient of Negit ∗ ΔNIit ∗ RFIOWNit−1 is still 
negative and significant for small firms and firms with high bid-ask spread (i.e., firms with 
high information asymmetry). However, it seems that there are no differences between the 
high- and low-growth subgroups. These findings suggest that our results hold irrespective 
of the measure of conservatism. In sum, the findings of the analysis given in Table 6 lend 
support to  H1 and  H2, pointing to higher conservative earnings for firms with greater for-
eign institutional ownerships, especially when information asymmetry is significant.
6.2  Controlling for cost stickiness
Banker et al. (2016) argue and provide evidence that the conservatism estimate in the Basu 
model is biased because the linear relation between earnings and returns can arise from 
the asymmetric response of changes in sales. In particular, they find that earnings are more 
sensitive to sales increases than sales decreases. To control for the confounding effects of 
cost stickiness, we re-estimate the model in Eq.  (3) after incorporating DSt, defined as a 
dummy variable that equals to one if changes in sales from year t − 1 to year t is nega-
tive, and zero otherwise; as well as ΔSt, defined as changes in sales from year t − 1 to year 
t that is scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year. We also 
add an interaction term DSt*ΔSt along with their interactions with ownership types (i.e., 
DSt*RFIOWNt−1, ΔSt*RFIOWNt−1, and DSt* ΔSt*RFIOWNt−1) and control variables.10 In 
(4)ΔNIit = 훽0 + 훽1Negit−1 + 훽2ΔNIit−1 + 훽3ΔNIit−1 ∗ Negit−1 + 휀it,
(5)
ΔNIit = 훽0 + 훽1Negit−1 + 훽2ΔNIit−1 + 훽3Negit−1 ∗ ΔNIit−1 + 훽4RFIOWNit−1
+ 훽5Negit−1 ∗ RFIOWNit−1 + 훽6ΔNIit−1 ∗ RFIOWNit−1 + 훽7Negit−1 ∗ ΔNIit−1
∗ RFIOWNit−1 + 훽8−12Controlsit−1 + 훽13−17Negit−1 ∗ Controlsit−1 + 훽18−22ΔNIit−1
∗ Controlsit−1 + 훽23−27Negit−1 ∗ ΔNIit−1 ∗ Controlsit−1 + 휀it
10 For brevity, we do not report the coefficients of DS, ΔS and their interactions with control variables.
Foreign institutional ownership and demand for accounting…
1 3
line with our earlier findings, the results in Table 7 confirm the positive relation between 
foreign institutional ownership and conservatism.
Table 7  The effect of foreign ownership on accounting conservatism measured by the Basu model control-
ling for cost stickness and using ownership decile ranks
This table reports results from the pooled OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is NI, defined as 
net income after extraordinary items, scaled by the beginning of the year market value of equity. ∆St rep-
resents the sales changes from year t−1 to t scaled by the beginning of the market value of equity. DSt is a 
dummy variable equals to one if sales changes are negative and zero otherwise. All estimations include year 
dummies. Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and year 
level. ***, **, * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (two tailed). We do not remark 
the firm subscript i for brevity. For Models 3 and 4, all variables, except Ret and Neg, are scaled decile 
ranks from 0 to 1
Exp. sign controlling for cost stickness using ownership decile ranks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rett 0.161 0.275 0.130 0.333**
(0.806) (0.836) (0.141) (0.140)
Negt − 0.055 − 0.064 − 0.019 − 0.046
(0.235) (0.227) (0.067) (0.066)
Rett*Negt + 0.001 − 0.123 0.089 − 0.178
(1.282) (1.294) (0.178) (0.180)
∆St 0.185 0.051
(0.304) (0.273)
DSt − 0.183 − 0.224
(0.295) (0.273)
∆St*DSt − 0.011 0.156
(0.481) (0.428) (0.180)
RFOWNt−1 0.112 − 0.011
(0.282) (0.034)
Rett*RFIOWNt−1 − 1.527** − 0.235***
(0.610) (0.061)
Negt*RFIOWNt−1 0.038 0.059
(0.672) (0.058)
Rett*Negt*RFIOWNt−1 + 1.518*** 0.315**
(0.274) (0.101)
Rett*Negt*RDIOWNt−1 ? − 0.656 0.557 0.105 0.172
(0.531) (0.519) (0.133) (0.125)
Controls t−1 Included Included Included Included
Rett*Controls t−1 Included Included Included Included
Negt*Controls t−1 Included Included Included Included
Rett*Negt*Controls t−1 Included Included Included Included
∆St*Controls Included Included Not included Not included
DSt*Controls Included Included Not included Not included
∆St*  DSt*RFOWNt−1 Not included Included Not included Not included
∆St*  DSt*RDOWNt−1 Not included Included Not included Not included
R2 0.177 0.191 0.141 0.154
# observations 1618 1618 1618 1618
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6.3  Decile rank of ownership
As another robustness test, we follow prior studies (e.g., LaFond and Roychowdhury 2008; 
Ramalingegowda and Yu 2012) and use scaled decile ranks for all foreign ownership and 
other variables included in our estimations except NI, Ret, Neg, and LIT. We calculate the 
scaled decile ranks by first ranking the observations by year into ten groups from one to 
ten and then dividing the ranking by ten. As such, the rank variable ranges from zero to 
one. The reported results in Model (4) of Table 7 show that the estimated coefficient of 
Rett*Negt*RFIOWNt−1 is positive and significant at the 5% level, confirming our results 
that foreign institutional ownership is associated with higher conservatism.
6.4  Causality tests
The results above are consistent with the notion that higher ownership by foreign institu-
tional investors is positively associated with conservatism. However, one may argue that 
local firms may reassure foreign investors and commit to more accounting conservatism to 
attract foreign investments (the ‘reverse’ causality explanation). It could also be the case 
since foreign institutions (particularly foreign corporations) are more likely to invest more 
in well-governed firms (Leuz et al. 2008). As a result, foreign institutional investors may 
be attracted to firms with more conservative reporting as a channel through which they 
can reduce their monitoring costs and information disadvantage. Moreover, an increase in 
foreign institutional residual ownership and conservatism may also arise simultaneously 
and driven by other unknown factors (the ‘simultaneity’ explanation) (Ramalingegowda 
and Yu 2012). To mitigate these concerns, we estimate lead-lag regressions by regressing 
accounting conservatism on the lagged, current, and lead values of residual institutional 
ownership. Following prior research (e.g., Ramalingegowda and Yu 2012), we add the cur-
rent and lead residual ownership by foreign institutions to Eq. (3) as follows:
If β11 > 0 and significant, the reverse causality would be a concern and the simultaneity 
explanation would be consistent with a significant and positive β15.
Table 8 presents the estimation results of this test. We find that accounting conservatism 
is positively associated with lagged residual ownership by foreign corporations. Specifi-
cally, the coefficient of Negit ∗ Retit ∗ RFIOWNit−1 is positive and statistically significant at 
the 1% level. This result is consistent with the conjuncture that higher ownership by foreign 
institutions leads to higher demand for conservatism. However, we find no relation between 
(6)
NIit = 훽0 + 훽1Negit + 훽2Retit + 훽3Negit ∗ Retit + 훽4RFIOWNit−1
+ 훽5Negit ∗ RFIOWNit−1 + 훽6Retit ∗ RFIOWNit−1
+ 훽7Negit ∗ Retit ∗ RFIOWNit−1 + 훽8RFIOWNit
+ 훽9Negit ∗ RFIOWNit + 훽10Retit ∗ RFIOWNit
+ 훽11Negit ∗ Retit ∗ RFIOWNit + 훽12RFIOWNit+1
+ 훽13Negit ∗ RFIOWNit+1 + 훽14tit ∗ RFIOWNit+1
+ 훽15Negit ∗ Retit ∗ RFIOWNit+1 + 훽16−20Controlsit−1
+ 훽21−25Negit ∗ Controlsit−1 + 훽26−30Retit ∗ Controlsit−1
+ 훽31−35Negit ∗ Retit ∗ Controlsit−1 + 휀it
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the current or lead residual ownership by foreign institutions and conservatism, suggesting 
that the reverse causality or the simultaneity explanations are not major concerns in this 
study. In summary, the results of this test suggest that our results above are not driven by 
Table 8  The relationship between accounting conservatism and current, lagged, and lead foreign institu-
tional ownership
This table reports results from the pooled OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is NI, defined as 
net income after extraordinary items, scaled by the beginning of the year market value of equity. All estima-
tions include year dummies. Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. Cluster-adjusted robust standard 
errors are in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and year level. ***, **, * denote signifi-
cance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (two-tailed). We do not remark the firm subscript i for brevity
Exp. sign (1) (2) (3) (4)
Rett 0.209 0.120 0.233 0.098
(0.912) (0.892) (0.947) (0.914)
Negt 0.058 0.030 0.112 0.063
(0.305) (0.325) (0.257) (0.280)
Rett*Negt + 0.366 0.436 0.421 0.516
(1.193) (1.264) (1.219) (1.208)
Rett*Negt*RFIOWNt−1 + 1.375*** 2.891* 1.907*** 2.682**
(0.327) (1.228) (0.535) (1.084)
Rett*Negt*RFIOWNt ? − 2.954* − 3.700
(1.492) (2.417)
Rett*Negt*RFIOWNt+1 ? − 1.305 1.110
(1.726) (2.636)
Rett*Negt*RDIOWNt−1 ? 0.694 0.571 0.647 0.373
(0.612) (0.505) (0.634) (0.664)
Rett*Negt*SIZEt−1 − 0.001 − 0.001 − 0.002 − 0.002
(0.072) (0.074) (0.073) (0.072)
Rett*Negt*LEVt−1 + − 0.511 − 0.542 − 0.563 − 0.579
(0.604) (0.617) (0.616) (0.629)
Rett*Negt*MBt−1 − 0.008 0.013 0.014 0.007
(0.037) (0.033) (0.038) (0.035)
Rett*Negt*RISKt−1 + − 9.307 − 10.484 − 10.339 − 11.600
(7.605) (7.319) (7.658) (7.435)
Rett*Negt*AGEt−1 − − 0.016 − 0.022 − 0.002 − 0.026
(0.142) (0.130) (0.151) (0.144)
Rett*Negt*LITt−1 + − 0.114 − 0.080 − 0.145 − 0.103
(0.169) (0.156) (0.154) (0.143)
Controls t−1 Included Included Included Included
Rett*Controls t−1 Included Included Included Included
Negt*Controls t−1 Included Included Included Included
RFIOWN (current, lead, and lag) Included Included Included Included
Rett*RFIOWN (current, lead, and lag) Included Included Included Included
Negt*RFIOWN (current, lead, and lag) Included Included Included Included
R2 0.135 0.143 0.143 0.154
# observations 1428 1428 1428 1428
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the causality or simultaneity concerns and that higher foreign institutional ownership leads 
to more accounting conservatism.11
7  Conclusion
This study investigates whether foreign institutional investors demand more conservative 
reporting when they hold equity shareholdings in domestic firms. We argue that they desire 
more conservatism as conservative reporting is expected to play an important governance 
role in reducing the informational disadvantages faced by foreign investors.
Using a unique dataset for a sample of publicly listed firms in Borsa Istanbul, our uni-
variate analysis and multivariate regression results show that higher foreign institutional 
ownership exerts a positive impact on accounting conservatism. This possibly suggests that 
foreign investors demand more conservative reporting practices. However, we also find that 
foreign corporate investors are the primary driver of the demand for conservative report-
ing. Moreover, the positive relationship between conservatism and foreign institutional 
ownership is more pronounced among firms prone to greater information asymmetry and 
growth opportunities. Importantly, our results indicate that the demand for accounting con-
servatism is stronger by foreign than domestic investors. This finding may arise from the 
alternative means which domestic investors employ to mitigate the costs of the potential 
agency. Our results are robust when we use an alternative measure of accounting conserva-
tism and employ different empirical specifications. Finally, the results remain qualitatively 
similar when we also control for potential reverse causality and simultaneity problems.
Our study extends prior research by providing evidence for the role of foreign institu-
tional investors in shaping corporate reporting practices. Moreover, we provide direct evi-
dence from an emerging market where the demand for conservatism is likely to be driven 
by lower levels of transparency, greater informational problems, weaker governance prac-
tices, and greater agency costs. Although the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) and Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) remove accounting conserv-
atism from the conceptual frameworks of financial reporting, our results run against the 
view that conservatism is not an essential feature of accounting information. The results 
provide support for the relevance of accounting conservatism to investors who are informa-
tionally disadvantaged. The analysis, therefore, contributes to the ongoing debate about the 
benefits of accounting conservatism in equity markets.12 In this respect, the findings of this 
study can be of interest to regulators and policymakers.
Our results, however, should be interpreted with the following caveats in mind. First, 
a key concern regarding the explanation of our results relates to the ability of account-
ing conservatism proxies to capture conservative reporting behavior adequately. Although 
we employ alternative measures of accounting conservatism, we cannot rule out the pos-
sibility that the potential measurement errors associated with these proxies can drive the 
results. Second, while we attempt to mitigate the potential consequences, reverse causality 
and simultaneity can still be of empirical concerns. Third, our study does not identify any 
12 The debates with and against the removal of accounting conservatism from the conceptual framework or 
its benefits from value relevance and contracting views are beyond the scope of this paper and we refer the 
reader to other studies (e.g., Mora and Walker 2015) for more discussion.
11 Our results are qualitatively similar when we perform firm-fixed effects estimation and also drop domes-
tic ownership from our empirical specification.
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other mechanisms that foreign investors can use alternatively or jointly with conservatism 
to control for the adverse consequences of capital market imperfections. This awaits future 
research.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
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